• Jakarta embassy requests $100k for its social media strategy | The Guardian
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/248491

    Action/funding request in paragraph 5. 2. Summary: Mission Indonesia requests immediate additional funding to use new media and social networking tools maximize online outreach for the POTUS visit scheduled for late March, 2010. Already the leading U.S. Mission in the world on Facebook with nearly 50,000 “fans,” and one of the leading Missions using Twitter, YouTube and engaging local bloggers to promote USG messages and information, we are uniquely positioned to use these tools to amplify key topics and themes to support the upcoming visit by President Obama. We request $100,000 in funding from R to boost our Facebook fan page membership to 1 million, and can accomplish this in 30 days. End Summary. Proven PD 2.0 Expertise

    The funds would also be used to promote the visit and our fan page as the place to learn more by extensively advertising on Indonesian online portals, banner ads, YouTube, Twitter, and other promotional efforts, including embedding bloggers, contests and giveaways, and using SMS technology.

    Je me demande ce que signifie, en pratique, « embedding bloggers ».

    Les amateurs de chez Guardian n’indiquent pas la date d’émission du câble. Il est indiqué sur une autre page : en février 2010.

    #cablegate #Indonésie #Facebook

  • Il y a deux semaines, j’écrivais, dans « De la mauvaise utilisation de Wikileaks » :
    http://seenthis.net/messages/5798

    Il y a un aspect particulièrement navrant dans l’utilisation journalistique des #Wikileaks, qui consiste à considérer que, puisque ce sont des échanges diplomatiques secrets révélés, alors ils révèlent « la réalité ».

    Or, ces échanges ne révèlent pas la réalité du terrain, mais :
    – ce que les américains pensent être la réalité,
    – les échanges qu’ils ont eu avec leurs interlocuteurs.

    Illustration spectaculaire aujourd’hui grâce à #Michael_Moore : se basant sur un câble du responsable de l’USINT de la Havane, la presse (y compris le Guardian) a annoncé que le film de Michael Moore, Sicko, a été interdit à #Cuba :
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/139530
    Encore des guillemets qui ont disparu du simple fait d’une affirmation (fausse, donc) dans un câble « confidentiel ». Le film de Michael Moore, comme il l’explique, n’a pas été interdit à Cuba : il est carrément passé sur la chaîne de télévision nationale.

    ¡Viva WikiLeaks ! SiCKO Was Not Banned in Cuba | MichaelMoore.com
    http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/mike-friends-blog/viva-wikileaks

    Sounds convincing, eh?! There’s only one problem — the entire nation of Cuba was shown the film on national television on April 25, 2008! The Cubans embraced the film so much so it became one of those rare American movies that received a theatrical distribution in Cuba. I personally ensured that a 35mm print got to the Film Institute in Havana. Screenings of ’Sicko’ were set up in towns all across the country. In Havana, ’Sicko’ screened at the famed Yara Theater.

    But the secret cable said Cubans were banned from seeing my movie. Hmmm.

  • #Cablegate : #Hillary_Clinton découvre que les dettes, ça a un poids politique. Évoquant la #Chine en mars 2009, qui détient une importante partie des bonds du trésor émis par les États-Unis, elle se demande : « Comment peut-on tenir tête à son banquier ? »

    Sujet traité par le Guardian :

    Hillary Clinton’s question : how can we stand up to Beijing ?
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/04/wikileaks-cables-hillary-clinton-beijing

    Hillary Clinton revealed America’s deep anxiety over China’s growing economic power and hold on US finances by asking Australia’s then prime minister: “How do you deal toughly with your banker?”

    The question, at a lunch with Kevin Rudd last March and reported in a US Department of State cable, underscores the evolving and often difficult relationship between the world’s superpower and an increasingly mighty China. It is the largest holder of US treasury bonds, with around $870bn. Tensions are also highlighted in an economic dispatch, written by the US ambassador to Beijing last January, warning of a “rough” year for relations between the two countries and accusing China of hubris.

    Et le câble en question :
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/199393

    PM Rudd said Chinese Politburo member Li Changchun had indicated Chinese leaders viewed the Secretary’s recent visit to Beijing as a success and felt they could deal with the Obama Administration. The Secretary affirmed the U.S. desire for a successful China, with a rising standard of living and improving democracy at a pace Chinese leaders could tolerate, noting the impressive achievements in Chinese democracy at the village level. We wanted China to take more responsibility in the global economic sphere, create more of a social safety net for its people, and construct a better regulatory framework for the goods China manufactures. The Secretary also noted the challenges posed by China’s economic rise, asking, “How do you deal toughly with your banker?”

  • Octobre 2009 : les #cablegate révèlent que des soldats américains opèrent déjà au #Pakistan :

    Pakistan approves secret US special forces deployment | guardian.co.uk
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/229065

    The Pakistani Army has for just the second time approved deployment of U.S. special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations. The first deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK elements embedded with the Frontier Corps in XXXXXXXXXXXX, occurred in September (reftel). Previously, the Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations personnel with their military forces.

    Sujet présenté par le Guardian :
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-cables-us-forces-embedded-pakistan

    Small teams of US special forces soldiers have been secretly embedded with Pakistani military forces in the tribal belt, helping to hunt down Taliban and al-Qaida fighters and co-ordinate drone strikes, the embassy cables reveal.

    The numbers involved are small – just 16 soldiers in October 2009 – but the deployment is of immense political significance, described in a cable that provides an unprecedented glimpse into covert American operations in the world’s most violent al-Qaida hotbed.

  • Pfizer nears $75m Nigeria settlement | guardian.co.uk
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/203205

    Le responsable de Pfizer explique aux américains que le #laboratoire_pharmaceutique a engagé des enquêteurs pour tenter de découvrir des « liens de corruption » concernant le procureur général fédéral du #Nigéria (qui poursuit Pfizer) et « fuiter » les révélations dans la presse pour faire pression sur lui.

    [Pfizer Country Manager] Liggeri said Pfizer was not happy settling the case, but had come to the conclusion that the $75 million figure was reasonable because the suits had been ongoing for many years costing Pfizer more than $15 million a year in legal and investigative fees. According to Liggeri, Pfizer had hired investigators to uncover corruption links to Federal Attorney General Michael Aondoakaa to expose him and put pressure on him to drop the federal cases. He said Pfizer

    Comme pour le cas de Shell, ce qui est assez sidérant (ou pas du tout), c’est qu’une entreprise vienne se vanter auprès de l’ambassade américaine de telles pratiques.

    L’article du Guardian sur l’affaire donne des infos sur l’affaire qui concerne Pfizer :
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/dec/09/wikileaks-cables-pfizer-nigeria

    While many thousands fell ill during the Kano epidemic, Pfizer’s doctors treated 200 children, half with Trovan and half with the best meningitis drug used in the US at the time, ceftriaxone. Five children died on Trovan and six on ceftriaxone, which for the company was a good result. But later it was claimed Pfizer did not have proper consent from parents to use an experimental drug on their children and there were questions over the documentation of the trial. Trovan was licensed for adults in Europe, but later withdrawn because of fears of liver toxicity.

    #cablegate

  • Le désarmement n’engage que ceux qui y croient :

    Whitehall told US to ignore Brown’s Trident statement | The Guardian
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/dec/08/wikileaks-cables-trident-nuclear-us

    The London embassy sent a secret cable back to Washington last autumn reporting conversations with the two civil servants, Richard Freer and Judith Gough, in which they cast doubt on the significance of Brown’s announcement at the UN general assembly that Britain might cut the number of planned new Trident submarines from four to three.

    Pour la France, réduire l’armement nucléaire, c’est de la démagogie :
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/218931

    Araud and the Elysee’s Guillaud fear British nuclear policy is being guided for the moment by Labour Party “demagogues” for domestic political consumption. Briens added that Gordon Brown seems to have decided disarmament will be his legacy, and the UK has moved from talking about disarmament as a political sop to gain parliamentary support for renewing its Trident force, to embracing disarmament as an end in itself. According to Briens, in some fora, the UK has shown willingness to accept clauses calling for a “ban on nuclear weapons.” Critically, UK rhetoric suggests that nuclear weapons are inherently bad, thus implying that maintaining a deterrent force is immoral. For France “nuclear weapons are not bad or good, they just are.” Thus, France continues to oppose the phrase “a world free of nuclear weapons,” which in Araud’s view implies a moral judgment. However, France can accept “a world without nuclear weapons,” which the GOF thinks is more neutral.

    Ne pas perdre de vue que la bombe atomique, c’est une question d’identité nationale (je savais pas, mais bon, sur ce sujet tout est possible) :

    However, France’s concerns about U.S. rhetoric go beyond RevCon tactics and to the heart of French nuclear theology. Araud said that any statements that are seen to delegitimize the idea of a nuclear deterrent capacity directly threaten French strategic interests, which are fundamentally and “psychologically” bound to France’s deterrent. France’s policy of nuclear deterrence is supported by parties across the political spectrum and has become an essential part of French strategic identity.

    #désarmement #Grande-Bretagne #cablegate #France #armement_nucléraire #bombe_atomique

  • Oil giants squeeze #Chávez as #Venezuela struggles | guardian.co.uk
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/09/wikileaks-oil-giants-squeeze-chavez

    Italy’s ambassador to Caracas, Luigi Maccotta, told his US counterpart that Italian oil company ENI squeezed PDVSA over an Orinoco belt deal in January this year knowing it had no one else to turn to.

    The Italians delayed the signing by two days to reinforce the Venezuelan government’s “need for ENI”. Paolo Scaroni, the company’s CEO, then faced down Venezuela’s oil minister, Rafael Ramirez, over changes to terms and conditions.

    “Thirty minutes before the ceremony was supposed to begin Scaroni told Ramirez: ’Take it or leave it, I can get on my plane and move on.’ Ramirez apparently used that half an hour to convince President Chávez to accept all of ENI’s proposed changes or risk losing the deal,” according to the US cable. The Italians said they would not pay PDVSA a standard signing bonus because the company already owed them $1bn.

    Le #cablegate original :
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/248231

    #pétrole

  • I like to move it move it... On en apprend donc de belles sur les princes séoudiens.

    US embassy cables : Saudi youth ’frolic under princely protection’ | guardian.co.uk
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/235420

    Summary: Behind the facade of Wahabi conservatism in the streets, the underground nightlife for Jeddah’s elite youth is thriving and throbbing. The full range of worldly temptations and vices are available — alcohol, drugs, sex — but strictly behind closed doors. This freedom to indulge carnal pursuits is possible merely because the religious police keep their distance when parties include the presence or patronage of a Saudi royal and his circle of loyal attendants, such as a Halloween event attended by ConGenOffs on October 29. Over the past few years, the increased conservatism of Saudi Arabia’s external society has pushed the nightlife and party scene in Jeddah even further underground.

    On peut lire l’article du Guardian sur le sujet, assez marrant :
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/07/wikileaks-cables-saudi-princes-parties

    #Arabie_saoudite #cablegate

  • De mieux en mieux : une semaine après les événements de mai 2008, les séoudiens suggèrent aux Américains l’envoi d’une « force arabe » sous mandat des Nations unies et sous couverture navale et aérienne des États-Unis et de l’OTAN pour chasser le Hezbollah du Liban.

    US embassy cables : Saudi prince urges need for ’security response’ to Hezbollah threat in Lebanon | guardian.co.uk
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/153797

    Opening a discussion with S/I Satterfield focused largely on Iraq, Saud first turned to Lebanon and stated that the effort by “Hizballah and Iran” to take over Beirut was the first step in a process that would lead to the overthrow of the Siniora government and an “Iranian takeover of all Lebanon.” Such a victory, combined with Iranian actions in Iraq and on the Palestinian front, would be a disaster for the US and the entire region. Saud argued that the present situation in Beirut was “entirely military” and that the solution must be military as well. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were too fragile to bear more pressure; they needed urgent backing to secure Beirut from Hizballah’s assault. What was needed was an “Arab force” drawn from Arab “periphery” states to deploy to Beirut under the “cover of the UN” and with a significant presence drawn from UNIFIL in south Lebanon “which is sitting doing nothing.” The US and NATO would be asked to provide equipment for such a force as well as logistics, movement support, and “naval and air cover.”

    3. (S) Satterfield asked what support this concept had from Siniora and from other Arab states. Saud responded that “Siniora strongly supports,” but that only Jordan and Egypt “as well as Arab League SYG Moussa” were aware of the proposal, lest premature surfacing result in its demise. No contacts had been made with Syria on any Beirut developments, Saud said, adding, “what would be the use?”

    An “Easier Battle to Win”
    –-

    4. (S) Saud said that of all the regional fronts on which Iran was now advancing, the battle in Lebanon to secure peace would be an “easier battle to win” (than Iraq or on the Palestinian front). Satterfield said that the “political and military” feasibility of the undertaking Saud had outlined would appear very much open to question. In particular, attempting to establish a new mandate for UNIFIL would be very problematic. Satterfield said the US would carefully study any Arab decision on a way forward. Saud concluded by underscoring that a UN/Arab peace-keeping force coupled with US air and naval support would “keep out Hezbollah forever” in Lebanon.

    Après le « coup du 5 mai » :
    http://seenthis.net/messages/6224
    le soutien principal du 14 Mars se verrait bien en train d’envahir et bombarder le Liban. Charmant.

    Saud prétend que ce « concept » est « fortement soutenu » par Sanioura. Ça ne prouve rien (ouï-dire), mais ça va encore tanguer pour les 14 Mars...

    Saud, représentant d’un des principaux acteurs arabes de la région, utilise l’expression « easy to win » pour désigner, avec les américains :
    – une guerre contre le Hezbollah (on s’en doutait),
    – mais aussi l’Iraq et « le front palestinien » !
    Ce passage est proprement scandaleux.

    #cablegate #Liban #Arabie_séoudite #Sanioura

    • Une autre remarque : ce qui est sidérant dans ce câble, c’est la nullité absolue de la proposition séoudienne.
      – Qui peut imaginer qu’il soit possible de déployer une « force arabe » au Liban sans l’accord de la Syrie ?
      – Quels États arabes pourraient bien se permettre, face à l’opinion publique (notamment arabe), d’envoyer des troupes pour combattre le Hezbollah, la seule force arabe ayant réellement résisté efficacement à Israël ? Quel État arabe (même dictatorial) dispose de soldats réellement motivés pour aller combattre le Hezbollah ?
      – Par transitivité : les armées arabes n’ont pas vaincu Israël, Israël n’a pas vaincu le Hezbollah, donc il faut vivre sur une autre planète pour imaginer une force arabe vaincre le Hezbollah.

      Du coup, je ne vois que deux explications :
      – le ministre des affaires étangères séoudien, le Prince Saud Al-Faisal, est vraiment un simplet et un détraqué mental, ce qui n’est jamais à exclure ;
      – sinon, le véritable but de ces manœuvres n’est, une fois de plus, pas de détruire le Hezbollah, mais tout simplement de déstabiliser et faire éclater le Liban. Parce qu’une intervention militaire arabe au Liban n’aurait aucun autre effet que celui-là.

  • Rami Zurayk note l’intérêt des américains pour la « sécurité alimentaire » des États du #Golfe_arabe :
    http://landandpeople.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-and-arab-food-security-tool.html

    Il se base sur le #cablegate suivant :
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/235574

    "A NEW TREND : THE IMPORTANCE OF FOOD SECURITY

    –-------------------------------------------

    16. (SBU) FOOD SECURITY EQUALS NATIONAL SECURITY

    –- (SBU) Gulf countries can produce no more than 10-15 percent of their own food needs, and therefore regard food security as a national security issue. To that end, Qatar has established a National Food Security Program (NFSP) under the direction of the Crown Prince.

    –- (SBU) The NFSP is tasked with developing a food security strategy for Qatar, and a strategy for leading the rest of the Arab world in developing new structures and partnerships for achieving food security for the entire region.

    –- (C) We expect the NFSP and others seized with food security over the coming 36 months to diminish their interest in highly complicated and risky land purchases in developing countries and to shift toward establishing partnerships with producers in developed countries, such as the U.S. We expect to see growing interest in learning about sophisticated financial instruments that can be employed to smooth out prices and supply gaps, such as commodity futures and virtual stocking. We also expect Qatar to improve its stocking capabilities, both onshore and off."

    Parmi ses remarques :
    – le Qatar et les arabes vont cesser de chercher à investir dans d’autres pays pour assurer leur sécurité alimentaire, même dans des pays arabes comme le Soudan, et même lorsque le but était de promouvoir des scénarios gagnant-gagnant en faveur des pauvres ;
    – il vaut mieux laisser cette stratégie aux multinationales qui exploitent la terre ;
    – la sécurité alimentaire doit se baser sur les marchés, l’achat de nourriture auprès des « pays développés » tels que les États-Unis, et le développement d’instruments financiers ;
    – les dernières crises alimentaire et financière ont pourtant montré que ces outils n’étaient pas fiables et pouvaient être manipulés ou bloqués : la Russie a cessé l’exportation de blé pendant la crise, et les É-U ont commencé à développer des biocarburants au lieu de vendre du maïs en 2007 ;
    – le câble est clair : la #sécurité_alimentaire passe des « partenariats avec les producteurs dans les pays développés tels que les États-Unis » ; il conclut en français dans le texte : « Laissez-moi rire ».

  • #WikiLeaks cables: Saudi Arabia rated a bigger threat to Iraqi stability than Iran guardian.co.uk
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/05/wikileaks-cables-saudi-meddling-iraq

    "Iraqi government officials see Saudi Arabia, not Iran, as the biggest threat to the integrity and cohesion of their fledgling democratic state, leaked US state department cables reveal.

    The Iraqi concerns, analysed in a dispatch sent from the US embassy in Baghdad by then ambassador Christopher Hill in September 2009, represent a fundamental divergence from the American and British view of Iran as arch-predator in Iraq.

    “Iraq views relations with Saudi Arabia as among its most challenging given Riyadh’s money, deeply ingrained anti-Shia attitudes and [Saudi] suspicions that a Shia-led Iraq will inevitably further Iranian regional influence,” Hill writes.

    “Iraqi contacts assess that the Saudi goal (and that of most other Sunni Arab states, to varying degrees) is to enhance Sunni influence, dilute Shia dominance and promote the formation of a weak and fractured Iraqi government.”

    Hill’s unexpected assessment flies in the face of the conventional wisdom that Iranian activities, overt and covert, are the biggest obstacle to Iraq’s development."

    Et le câble concerné:
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/226620
    “Iraq views relations with Saudi Arabia as among its most challenging, given Riyadh’s money, deeply ingrained anti-Shia attitudes, and suspicions that a Shia-led Iraq will inevitably further Iranian regional influence.”

    #cablegate #Iran #Iraq #Arabie_Séoudite

  • Août 2007, un an après la guerre israélienne contre le #Liban, le chef du #Mossad, #Meir_Dagan, dit tout le bien qu’il pense du premier ministre libanais #Fouad_Sanioura:
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/120696

    Il annonce notamment que «les États-Unis et Israël [...] sont à deux doigts de parvenir à quelque chose au Liban, et ne peuvent pas se permettre de baisser la garde. Ce qui est nécessaire, c’est de trouver une façon de soutenir le Premier ministre Sanioura.»

    "17. (S) Dagan urged caution with respect to Lebanon, noting that the results of efforts there to bolster the Siniora government would impact Syria and Iraq. The U.S. and Israel, he said, are on the edge of achieving something in Lebanon, and so cannot afford to drop their guard. What is necessary is finding the right way to support PM Siniora. “He is a courageous man,” Dagan said. Syria, Iran and Hizballah are working hard against him. Dagan noted that much of what is animating the leadership of Lebanon to take on Syria is personal: “Hariri, Jumblat and others had their parents executed by the Syrians.” This anti-Syrian sentiment has forged an alliance based on personal and national interests. Siniora has worked well with the situation, but Dagan suggested that the odds are against him. Under Secretary Burns replied that the U.S. is trying to give PM Siniora as much support as possible, and that we would continue to consult closely with Israel on Lebanon. He noted that he would return to Israel in October."

    #wikileak #cablegate

  • Saudi Arabia urges US attack on Iran to stop nuclear programme | World news | guardian.co.uk
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cables-saudis-iran

    “King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has repeatedly urged the United States to attack Iran to destroy its nuclear programme, according to leaked US diplomatic cables that describe how other Arab allies have secretly agitated for military action against Tehran.”

    #wikileaks #cablegate

  • US diplomats spied on UN leadership | World news | guardian.co.uk

    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cables-spying-un

    «Washington is running a secret intelligence campaign targeted at the leadership of the United Nations, including the secretary general, Ban Ki-moon and the permanent security council representatives from China, Russia, France and the UK.

    A classified directive which appears to blur the line between diplomacy and spying was issued to US diplomats under Hillary Clinton’s name in July 2009, demanding forensic technical details about the communications systems used by top UN officials, including passwords and personal encryption keys used in private and commercial networks for official communications.»

    Et aussi des infos (très) personnelles:

    "Washington also wanted credit card numbers, email addresses, phone, fax and pager numbers and even frequent-flyer account numbers for UN figures and “biographic and biometric information on UN Security Council permanent representatives”."

    Le document d’origine:
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/219058

    #wikileaks #cablegate